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Dr. King's Speech:
Surveying the Landscape of Law and
Justice in the Speeches, Sermons, and
Writings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Carlton Waterhouset

The belief that an essential relationship exists between law
and justice has been recognized since the time of the ancient
In fact, the concept extends well beyond Western
Greeks.
philosophy and jurisprudence. Distinct from other aspects of
justice, the relationship between law and justice considers the
nature of law and its dictates, as well as the responsibility of
citizens to obey it. Although Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. lacked the
developed legal analysis of jurisprudence scholars, he made a
meaningful contribution to the intellectual discourse of his time by
forcing the discussion on broader society and centering it on racial
segregation-a critical issue of his day. This Article places Dr.
King's views of law and justice within a historic and contemporary
context by exploring the theory of law and justice and how it
shaped and inspired Dr. King's leadership of the Civil Rights
Movement. The Article begins by addressing a considerationof the
special relationship between "law and justice." It then explores the
three philosophical commitments that formed Dr. King's vision of
law andjustice: American democraticprinciples,Personalism,and
natural law. Lastly, this Article considers Dr. King's vision in
comparison to two schools of criticaljurisprudence: Critical Legal
Studies and Critical Race Theory. Dr. King saw clear contradictions in the legal system that violated the demands of law and
justice. This Article identifies and explores the valuable insights
provided by Dr. King's vision of law andjustice while still pointing
out the oversights and contradictionspresent in it.
t. Carlton Waterhouse, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law - Indianapolis; B.A. Penn State University; J.D. Howard University; M.T.S.
Emory University; Ph.D. Emory University. I would like to thank Anthony E.
Cook, Morehouse College President Robert Franklin, and Timothy Jackson for their
consideration of an earlier incarnation of this Article. I would like to express
special thanks to Neil Gotanda for his examination and thoughtful comments. I
also would like to thank George Wright, Florence Roisman, John Hill, and Tom
Wilson for their input and insights. My thanks also extend to Hao Wang for her
vital research assistance.
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"[T]hearc of the moral universe is long but it bends
towardjustice."'
-Dr. MartinLuther King, Jr.
Introduction
From whence springs the meaning of justice? Upon what
foundation rests its cornerstone? These questions and more
pervade recent discourses about justice. Likewise, with increasing
frequency, legal scholars and philosophers debate the viability of
justice arguments due to fundamental disagreements about the
nature of the world and the societies in which we live.'
Without the benefit of a legal education or a survey of legal
philosophy, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. weighed into a historic
debate in legal scholarship regarding the nature of law and the
responsibility of citizens to obey it.' Is law simply the pronounceIs it the
ment of authority with the power to sanction?'
historically contingent legislation of democratic regimes?' Is it
divine directive revealed to prophets and the faithful, binding
upon all?' Or is it a fundamental ordering of the universe made
clear to all through unimpeded reason?' King's views on law and
justice were developed and presented through sermons, addresses,
books, and other writings. 8 Although lacking the developed legal
analysis of jurisprudential scholars, King made a meaningful
contribution to the jurisprudential discourse of his time by opening
the discourse to broader society and centering it on a critical issue
of his day.9
Despite his lack of legal training, King benefited from an
excellent education and the unique ability to connect with both the
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here? (Aug. 16, 1967), in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 245, 252 (James M. Washington ed., 1991) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS].
2. See NANCY LEVIT ET AL., JURISPRUDENCE: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY,
at ix-x (2d ed. 2002).
3. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963),
reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 289, 289-303.
4. Id. at 293-94.
5. Id. at 292.
6. Id. at 293-94, 299-300.
7. Id. at 299, 301.
8. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Bold Design for a New South, NATION,
Mar. 30, 1963, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 112, 112-16;
Martin Luther King, Jr., Nonviolence and Racial Justice, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb.
6, 1957, reprintedin ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 5, 5-9.
9. DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 283-86 (1986).
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Black masses of the South suffering the hardships of segregation,
and the Northern Whites committed to the ideals of liberalism.10
Given the time and interest, King very well could have made a
more meaningful contribution to our understanding of law and
justice. While alive, King was not afforded the same luxuries of
abstract contemplation taken for granted by many ancient and
contemporary philosophers, and his ruminations were ultimately
cut short by a sniper's bullet." King's writings and addresses
nonetheless reveal a man genuinely concerned with the theological
Critical scholarship
and philosophical questions of his day."
endeavors to recognize and identify the insights and inconsistencies, limitations and lucidity in the words and ideas of men and
women like King, whose lives, like rudders, changed the course of
history." Through engagement with their writings, we should
come to better understand them and ourselves."
This Article strives to identify, understand, and critically
evaluate King's views on law and justice. Part I of the Article
begins with a brief consideration of the relationship between law
and justice. After considering some background on the subject, the
Article explores how the democratic principles of the United
States, natural law, and Personalism shaped King's understanding and articulations on the subject. Part II of the Article
examines King's proclaimed views in light of the insights of two
Critical Legal Studies and
schools of critical jurisprudence:
Critical Race Theory. The analysis concludes with a reflection on
the poignancy of the challenges to King's vision of law and justice
in light of historical developments of the last forty years.
I.

Law and Justice
The intersection of law and justice has a unique form,
distinct from the many other types of justice more commonly
spoken about." Broader than restorative justice, distributive
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. at 623-34.
12. See id. at 523 (describing King's contemplation of scripture as a "spiritual
mandate" to work together in furtherance of civil rights).
13. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE

MOVEMENT, at xiii-xxxii (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
CRITICAL RACE THEORY]. There is, of course, disagreement over the merit of claims
raised by some critical legal scholarship questioning the integrity of American
jurisprudence. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 271-75 (1986) (addressing
challenges raised by critical legal scholarship to the integrity of the American legal
system).
14. CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 13, at xiii-xvi.
15. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 122 (David Ross
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justice, retributive justice, compensatory justice, and procedural

justice, the intersection of law and justice incorporates and
facilitates one or more of the above aspects of justice.'" However,
unlike the above concepts, the intersection of law and justice-the
legal delivery of justice-depends on the juridical system of a
nation or a society." Ideally, law should serve the ends of justice.'
In his speeches and writings, King made the justness of laws and
the legal system itself of primary importance.'9
As a social system, law is broad reaching. Laws govern and
structure the relationships individuals maintain with one another,
as well as the relationships that individuals have with groups.2
Further, law establishes the relationship that individuals and
Laws range from
groups have with the nation or state."
legislative efforts to prescribe the boundaries of commercial and
other relationships, to governing a person's ability to be
compensated by another for some wrongful injury. In the United
States, laws even dictate and regulate the creation, operation, and
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 8th ed. 1971) ("For justice exists only between men
whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom
there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust.").
16. Julian Lamont & Christi Favor, Distributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
See
PHIL. (Mar. 5, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/justice-distributive/.
Oscar Ross Ewing, The New Legal Justice, 24 YALE L.J. 441 (1915) for a thoughtful
consideration of the concept and its development in Western thought.
17. I expand on this concept in a journal article addressing the interdependent
political nature of American society and its justice system. See Carlton
Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events, 26

B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 212 (2006) ("Neither the American judiciary nor its
legislatures has provided [Bilacks with a consistent level of protection against, or
remediation of, racial injustice. In America, race law is never settled; it remains,
instead, in constant flux [dependent] on the prevailing attitude of the majority.").
18. The substance of the ideal that should be used to define the relationship
between law and justice is the primary subject of contemporary jurisprudence.
LEVIT ET AL., supra note 2, at ix-x.
19. King memorably said:
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a
promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This was the
promise that all men, yes, [BIlack men as well as [Wihite men, would be
guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 217, 217; see also Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Prize
Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1964), in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 224,
224 ("I accept this award [on] behalf of a civil rights movement which is moving
with determination and a majestic scorn for risk and danger to establish a reign of
freedom and a rule of justice.").
20. THOMAS AQUINAS, AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS 81-82 (R.W. Dyson ed.,
2002) [hereinafter AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS].
21. See id.
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dissolution of marriage.2 2 Law determines suitable parties, the
duration of the relationship, and even the boundaries of acceptable
Over the course of American history, in particular
conduct.'
states, Blacks and other "non-Whites" were legally prohibited from
marriage, cohabitation, or sexual relationships with Whites; state
anti-miscegenation laws even made such acts felony offenses.'

A.

Justice and Legal Equality

One basic requirement of a law that corresponds with justice
is "equality before the law."25 This requirement is expressed by
the Greek philosopher Aristotle in his writings on justice:
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded
a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or
a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to
the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties
as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged,
6
and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it.
In this passage, Aristotle makes reference to what he calls
This term relates to an individual's
rectificatory justice."
treatment by a judge in a legal dispute." As a fundamental
matter, Aristotle maintains that justice requires equality before
the law, for it is only by looking at parties equally that the law
2
resolves disputes with the impartiality required by justice. " As an
example, Aristotle asserts that the facts at issue are paramount

22. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (1962) (prohibiting marriage among
"mentally incompetent persons," people of the same gender, and close relatives);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-80 (1962) (barring a married person from entering into a
second marital relationship while married); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (1962)
(stating the grounds for divorce as adultery, desertion, and physical cruelty, among
others).
23. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., Law of Feb. 10, 1955, ch. 126, 1955 N.D. Laws 157, §§ 1-4
(showing the repeal of North Dakota's miscegenation statutes §§ 14-0304, 14-0305,
14-0326, and 14-0327, enacted in 1943, which banned marriage between a White
person and a Black person, defined who would be considered to be Black, and
provided penalties for anyone issuing a marriage license to, or performing a
marriage between, a Black person and a White person); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-181 (1939) (repealed 1973); Jackson v. State, 23 Ala. App. 555 (1930)
(punishing "the mixture of races in marriage, or living together in a state of
adultery, or fornication, by a [WIhite person and a [Niegro, or descendant of a
[Niegro" as a felony under § 5001 of the Alabama Code of 1923).
25. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, at 114-15.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 115.
28. NICHOLAS BUNNIN & JIYuAN Yu, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 593 (2004).
29. ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, at 115.
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but not the character or the reputation of the individuals." A good
man who has defrauded a bad man is equally liable as a matter of
justice because both are equally liable for any crime that they
commit." In Aristotle's view, the actions of individuals should
govern the outcome of legal disputes, not their personal
characteristics.3 2
This notion of equality before the law has threads through
Western philosophy and jurisprudence, and blossomed in the
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution.33
The Declaration of Independence points to this concept in
considering the rights of all men: "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."34 As a matter of
law, the Constitution requires that cases and controversies, as
well as the rights of citizens, must be adjudicated and adjudged
without respect of persons." However, the extension of equality
before the law to Blacks was not widely recognized at the time of
the Declaration's signing.3 6 In the wake of the Revolutionary War
that soon followed, many Northern states abolished the enslavement of Blacks and removed some legal distinctions based on race
as contrary to the principles underlying American democracy."
Despite these strides, most states failed to extend full equality
before the law to Blacks." When the question of the legal equality

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. For a discussion of equality in the western tradition, see RONALD
DWOREIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
33. See U.S. CONST.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
34. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 33, at para. 2.
35. See the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital. or otherwise infamous
crime. unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor
shall any person be subiect for the same offence to be twice out in
.ieopardv of life or limb: nor shall be comoelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1861) ("[It is too clear for
dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and
formed no part of the people who framed and adopted [the Declaration of
Independence]."); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 371 (1978) ("The success of the first Revolution

in no way altered the degraded status of most [Bilack Americans .
free the more than half-million slaves in the colonies.").
37. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 36, at 381-89.
38. Id. at 371-75.

. . .

[n]or did it
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of Blacks came before the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v.
Sanford,39 the highest court of the land addressed whether Blacks
were entitled to rights equal to those of Whites." Writing for the
majority of the justices, Chief Justice Taney resolved the question,
writing:
The question before us is, whether the class of persons
described in the plea in abatement [enslaved and free Blacks]
compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members
of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are
not included, and were not intended to be included, under the
word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On

the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated
or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no
rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and
the Government might choose to grant them. 0
In the decision, the majority ruled that a formerly enslaved Black
man who gained his freedom through residence in a state
prohibiting slavery, could not bring suit in federal court as a
citizen of the United States when he was re-enslaved by his former
The Court
master after returning to the Antebellum South."
based the decision largely on its understanding that neither the
Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution contemplated
the inclusion of enslaved or free Blacks as those who were
endowed with rights recognized and established by those
documents."
Roughly eight decades after the Declaration of Independence
was signed, the Fourteenth Amendment spoke directly to the
issue. Stating that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to its jurisdiction shall be citizens, and that no
state shall deny the equal protection of the laws to any person

39. 60 U.S. 393.
40. Id. at 404-05.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 407. Discussing the prevailing opinion at the time the Declaration of
Independence was signed, Justice Taney wrote:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the [Wihite race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the [W]hite man was bound to respect; and that the [N]egro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
Id.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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within its jurisdiction, the Amendment directly overruled the
Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott and established, in
principle, that all men were entitled to equality before the law."
However, following a brief period of reconstruction, equal
protection before the law was a dead-letter principle in the South
as legislatures and judges abridged the rights of Blacks with
impunity.' Through the use of state and local laws designed to
maintain a subordinate status for Blacks, Southern White
legislatures returned Blacks to a degraded status using Jim Crow
laws that prohibited Blacks from free access to education, political
participation, employment, and public accommodations."
B. Justice and Racial Inequality

As a historical matter, equality before the law has evaded
Blacks across generations.'
From the time of the American
colonies to the birth of King, the relationship between law and
justice for most Whites was different than the relationship
experienced by Blacks.49
In the early colonies and in the
Antebellum South, Blacks, both bound and free, were prohibited
from using the legal procedures available to Whites, including the
basic right to testify against a White man or woman in court."o At
the onset of the New Deal, Blacks were functionally denied the
benefits of federal programs made available to Whites." In the
post-Reconstruction South, Blacks were legally bonded out to
Whites after being arrested on spurious charges." As discussed

45. Compare Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
46. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 17-37 (2004) (discussing how the

Supreme Court endorsed segregation on trains, state-mandated segregation, and
segregation in public schools).
47. Id.

48. See Carlton Waterhouse, supra note 17, at 229-51 for a discussion of
racially biased laws against Blacks from 1619 to 1963.
49. See ROBERT P. GREEN, JR., EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION EXPERIENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 33-34 (2000)

(discussing how freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution, like liberty, were
realized by White Americans but not their Black counterparts).
50. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 36, at 413 n.109. Blacks were only allowed
to testify in criminal cases where the charge was brought against another Black
person, or in civil cases where all parties were Black. Id.
51. See PHILIP F. RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 87-101 (2001)

(providing a history of the effects of the New Deal on Blacks and noting that it
"represented a federal sanctioning of [Wihite privileges and [Bilack discrimination
in employment, housing, schools and the franchise").
52. See William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 53-54 (Feb. 1976) (discussing how vagrancy
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above, through most of King's life, Jim Crow laws denied Blacks
equal access to jobs, housing, education, and medical care.3
As a result, the American legal system embodied a
substantial contradiction leading up to the Civil Rights Movement:
grand ideals of law and justice that promised equality before the
law clashing with the reality of the biased creation and
implementation of laws towards Blacks and other minorities."5 In
1954, the dawn following the long night of this legal contradiction
began to break when the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board
of Education" that laws requiring segregation in education were
Although the Court had issued earlier
unconstitutional.'
decisions undercutting segregation practices in more limited
situations," the wholesale rejection of segregation in the public
school system was a monumental occurrence with a significant
symbolic and practical effect." For King, the unanimous decision
suggested that the long-deferred hope of legal equality might soon
Indeed, the law and justice promised in the
be realized."
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution
was soon to come as King saw it, though it would require much
prodding and agitation."
Rather than a clear, uncontested meaning as might be
inferred by the Aristotelian formulation, in practice the concept of
laws allowed the hiring out of convicted offenders, and that offenders unable to pay
their fines would be sentenced to a term of labor).
53. See KLARMAN, supra note 46, at 90, 146-47, 204 (citing examples of
residential segregation and segregation in education).
54. See GREEN, supra note 49, at xxi-xxii (noting the tension in the American
legal system between the tradition of equality and rights, and the "existence of
slavery, discrimination and institutional racism").
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Id. at 495 (holding that the segregation of schools denied Black children in
public schools equal protection under the law guaranteed to them by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution).
57. See GREEN, supra note 49, at 235, 239 (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision preventing a law school from admitting students only on the basis of race
by rejecting the "separate but equal" claim).
58. See id. at 247 (noting that Brown was a "stunning reversal of precedent"
that finally recognized segregation as unconstitutional).
59. See id. at 301 (quoting King's statement that the Supreme Court's decision
"came as a great beacon of light of hope to millions of colored people throughout the
world who had had a dim vision of the promised land of freedom and justice");
JOSEPH WILSON, TEARING DOWN THE COLOR BAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS 300-09 (1989).
60. See GREEN, supra note 49, at 301 (quoting King's remark that Brown "was a
reaffirmation of the good old American doctrine of freedom and equality for all
men"); id. at 308-09 (noting that segregation is still rampant and that continued
work through the courts and legislatures is needed in order to make desegregation
a societal reality).
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equality before the law struggled to gain acceptance as something
widely available across preexisting social barriers such as race. 6 1
II. Philosophical Commitments of Dr. King to Law and
Justice
A. Personalism,Law, and Justice
King made it clear that the basic philosophical position
guiding his actions was rooted in a personal idealism.62 He wrote,
"Personalism's insistence that only personality-finite and
infinite-is ultimately real strengthened me in two convictions: it
gave me metaphysical and philosophical grounding for the idea of
a personal God, and it gave me a metaphysical basis for the
dignity and worth of all human personality."' King applied these
He
concepts in forming his views on what justice required.'
regarded racial discrimination and segregation as evils in society
that were manifestly unjust.65 On the subject he said, "Segregation stands diametrically opposed to the principle of the
sacredness of human personality. It debases personality."66 This
debasement, in King's view, took on multiple dimensions, harming
67
King felt that
both Blacks and Whites in the process.
discrimination and segregation treated Blacks as means to an end,
and not ends in and of themselves, thereby violating Immanuel
Kant's Categorical Imperative that "all men must be treated as
In King's view, the White
ends and never as mere means."'
Southerners' view of Blacks as property or "animated tools,"

61. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE
MONTGOMERY STORY 31-32 (1958) (describing the unequal system of justice in
Southern courts, where a Black male faced the death penalty for allegedly raping a
White woman, while White men seldom faced arrest for allegedly raping a Black
woman).
62. Id. at 100.
63. Id.
64. See Martin Luther King, Jr., The Ethical Demands for Integration (Dec. 27,
1962), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 117, 119, 122 ("There is
no divine right of one race which differs from the divine right of another. Every
human being has etched in his personality the indelible stamp of the Creator.
Human worth lies in relatedness to God.").
65. See id. at 118-19.
66. Id. at 119.
67. Id.
68. King, The Ethical Demands for Integration, supra note 64, at 119 ("The
tragedy of segregation is that it treats men as means rather than ends, and thereby
reduces them to things rather than persons.").
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cemented through Jim Crow laws, depersonalized Blacks and
desecrated the sacredness of their humanity.69
Segregation and the racial discrimination it legitimized also
afflicted Blacks with "social leprosy" that inflicted psychological as
well as physical scars, King contended." He explained that the
scars flowed from "suppressed fears and resentments, and the
expressed anxieties and sensitivities [made] each day of life a
turmoil."" Even Whites suffered from the reign of Jim Crow, in
King felt that the presumed inferiority and
King's estimation.
inequality of Blacks maintained through Jim Crow segregation
abused the image of God in them and proportionately decreased
the image of God in those Whites who inflicted the abuse."
Because segregation was based in legal code as much as
custom and practice, King saw the damage to the personhood of
Whites and Blacks caused by Jim Crow laws as a direct violation
of law and justice.74 The affront to personality caused by Jim Crow
laws served as significant evidence to King that the laws were
unjust and dictated civil disobedience as an ethical response.7
"Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that
"All
degrades human personality is unjust," he wrote. 76
segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the
soul and damages the personality."" As such, the first concern of
law and justice for King is the law's effect on human personality.
B. NaturalLaw and Justice
When King raised issues of moral justice, he drew upon an
ideal rooted in the classical western natural law tradition." This
tradition, grown from the writings of Greek philosophers and the
Christian scholars that influenced many of the sacred texts of
Judaism and Christianity, viewed justice as part of the natural

69. See id.
70. See id. at 121.
71. See id.

72. Id. at 122 (describing how the self cannot reach its full potential without
interacting with others and showing concern for them).
73. See King, The EthicalDemands for Integration,supra note 64, at 119.
74. See id. (noting that because the Constitution guarantees equality of all
people, Blacks have a right to the benefits espoused in the Constitution).
75. See id. at 124 (advocating nonviolent resistance as a means by which the
Black community can gain "total emancipation").
76. King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail,supra note 3, at 293.
77. Id.
78. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Love, Law and Civil Disobedience (Nov. 16,
1961), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 43, 50.
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order of the universe created by God and comprehended by human
beings through their ability to reason. 9
In this tradition, the laws of society are secondary to a higher
law that establishes the right and the good.' From this higher
law, human beings derive the norms of behavior toward each other
that govern their lives together. 1 What King called the human
law, within the tradition, represented the efforts of different
societies to enshrine the higher law in their particular legal
systems. 82 This "positive law" was subject to the higher or natural
law in moral terms.' Accordingly, a society's legal pronouncements could be viewed as good or bad on moral-as well as legal
and pragmatic-grounds."
On legal grounds, a law could be good or bad based on its
conformity with procedural requirements established by
preexisting legal requirements governing its promulgation or
pronouncement.
A law properly promulgated by a legislative
body or pronounced by a judge in light of preexisting legal
requirements would be good law.'
A law issued outside of
established procedural obligations or binding legal requirements
would be a bad law.17

79. See AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at xxxii-xxxiv.
80. Id.

81. Id. at xxxiii (noting that through natural law human beings know "to do
good and avoid evil").
82. Id. at 129 (discussing the extent to which human law is derived from
natural law).
83. See id. at 143-44 (describing human laws in terms of just and unjust laws,

stating that humans are bound to obey just laws because they derive from the
eternal law).
84. Id.
85. See Aquinas, Summa Theological of St. Thomas Aquinas, Question 90: The
Essence of Law, Article 4, reprinted in NEw ADVENT (2008) [hereinafter Aquinas,

Question 90]; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39, 39 (Yale Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1969) (discussing a list of factors that make a law bad: deciding rules on ad hoc
basis, failure to make the law available or publicize the law, retroactive laws,
failure to make laws understandable, contradictory laws, frequent changes in the
law that make it impossible for a subject to follow, and inconsistencies between how
the law is promulgated and how it is administrated).
86. See Aquinas, Question 90, supra note 85; FULLER, supra note 85, at 39-44
(discussing what factors contribute to a bad legal system and which ones contribute
to a good legal system).
87. See Aquinas, Question 90, supra note 85; FULLER, supra note 85, at 39.
[There can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a

moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret
from him, or that came into existence only after he acted, or was
unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same system, or

commanded the impossible, or changed every minute.
Id.
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In a prudential or a pragmatic sense, a law could be good or
bad based on its expected or actual effects." A law that positively
affects a society through its application or from its mere
promulgation would be a good law, while a law that negatively
affects the society would be a bad law.' Of course, consequences
cannot always be seen in advance so, as a pragmatic matter, laws
that are good in practice actually accomplish desirable ends and
should be distinguished from those that merely portend certain
results." A law that is initially universally endorsed may be later
universally rejected because of an unanticipated consequence,
while a law that enjoys little support in its development may be
widely praised in the future because of some foreseeable but
unanticipated benefit."
In these instances, reason may not dictate any particular
position regarding a law because of its lack of apparent moral
content; however, the effect of the law may have moral significance
that places it within or beyond the bounds of natural law.' Take,
for example, a law governing the appearance of the uniforms of
guards. If the uniform included a feather from the favored bird of
the nation that inadvertently caused a debilitating and ultimately
deadly rash on all of the guards, the continued application of the
law requiring the use of the feather would take on moral
significance, and be judged in turn in accordance with the natural
law. Accordingly, in both a pragmatic and a moral sense, this
would be a bad law because it prevents guards from serving and
unintentionally deprives them of their lives without good reason."
88. See AQUINAS:

POLITICAL WRITINGS,

supra note 20, at xxxiii, 97-99

(discussing the good and bad effects laws can have on society). But see FULLER,
supra note 85, at 153-57 (arguing that the internal morality of the law is an
essential condition of law itself, and that "law is a precondition of good law").
89. See AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at xxxiii (discussing that
human laws that require conformance to "standards of virtuous conduct" can have
a positive impact on society by forming "genuinely virtuous habits" in humans
whereas unjust laws "[oppress] those subject to them," having a negative impact).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 97 ("[Tjhe proper effect of the law is to lead its subjects to their
proper virtue; and since virtue is 'that which makes its possessor good,' it follows
that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given good, either
absolutely or relatively."). Here I speak of laws that lack apparent moral
significance in their formulation but have outcomes that take on moral importance.
92. See id. at 97-99 (noting that a proper law has a good effect either relatively
or absolutely on those whom it governs).
93. See id. at xxxiii-xxxiv (noting that a prerequisite to having a just human
law is that it should be an inference made by reasoning from natural law); Edward
S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARv. L. REV. 365, 383 (1929) (noting that "life, liberty, and estate" are natural law
rights that are embedded into the American constitutional framework).
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Natural law then establishes a moral norm that can be used
to judge the moral character of a nation's laws.' A society's laws
may conform to or violate the natural law in their formulation,
their implementation, or their outcome." A law that conforms to
the higher moral or natural law would then be a good law, while a
law that conflicts with the moral law would be a bad law.96 Under
this approach, knowledge of morality or natural law is accessible
to human beings through their ability to reason. 7 However, this
classic or traditional understanding of natural law places it
outside the bounds of human control or subjectivity." Accordingly,
the natural law is not bound by culture, nationality, or time,
though knowledge and awareness of it may vary."
Saint Thomas Aquinas offered a systematic treatment of
natural law that was referenced by King in the Letter from the
Birmingham City Jail.' King wrote, "[tlo put it in terms of Saint
Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted
in eternal and natural law."'' The system developed by Aquinas
places all laws within a structured hierarchy that begins with God
in the creation of the world through divine wisdom." This divine
wisdom manifests the eternal law that permeates perfectly
throughout the natural law and imperfectly in human laws. 1o3 In
the natural law, the eternal law can be better known through
reason." Reason, commonly distributed to humanity, allows the
natural law in its general precepts to be known to all, while its
conclusions in particular circumstances may be unclear because of
When human laws violate the
bad habits or dispositions.'o
are
unjust laws that do not accord
law,
they
dictates of the natural
94. See Aquinas, Summa Theological of St. Thomas Aquinas, Question 95:
Human Law, Article 2, reprinted in NEW ADVENT (2008) [hereinafter Aquinas,

Question 951.
95. See AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 143-44 (describing

just and unjust laws).
96. See id. at 139-43. This should be distinguished from the legal prohibition
of all vices and prescription of all virtues, both of which Aquinas rejects. See id.
97. Id. at 121.
98. See Aquinas, Question 95, supra note 94 (listing a number of factors as to
why human law cannot be derived from natural law).
99. See AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 123-25 (noting that
natural law is "equally valid everywhere").
100. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supra note 3, at 293.
101. Id.
102. See AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 105-07 ("[A]11 laws
proceed from eternal law.").
103. See id.
104. See id. at 118-21.

105. See id. at 120-23.
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with reason or the eternal law. " Despite the close connections
within the system, Aquinas allows room for variation in positive
human law dependent upon the society and circumstances.o
These variations do not necessarily violate natural or eternal law
as long as they concern matters for which natural law and reason
dictate no particular action.0 s
For King, the law of segregation was a corrupt human law
that was unjust in its implementation, its consequences, and its
formulation." King based his view on his understanding of moral
law, which held all humans as equal beings worthy of equal regard
0
and consideration that afforded them certain natural rights.n"
In the Letter from Birmingham City Jail, King provided the
most detailed elaboration of his views on law and justice."'
Written in response to a letter printed in the Birmingham
newspaper by eight prominent local clergy criticizing civil rights
protests in the city, the letter provided King the opportunity to
defend the Civil Rights Movement from the attacks of critics both
locally and nationally.112 To accomplish this, King placed the
movement's goals and tactics in the broader context of natural law
and justice. "'
I begin with a similar, though more abbreviated, explanation
of King's views on law and justice from his address to the Annual
Meeting of the Fellowship of the Concerned in 1961."1

In this

address, he defended the sit-ins and freedom rides of students
fighting for civil rights to an interracial group that included White
liberal allies who preferred a more gradual approach to the civil
disobedience of the students."' To counter the claims that it was
inconsistent for the students and other civil rights activists to call
for compliance with the Brown v. Board of Education decision
while violating the segregation laws, King enunciated what he saw
106. See id. at 143-44.
107. See AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 135-36 (describing
various forms human civil law may take depending on the form of government that
enacts the law).
108. Id. at 121-22, 135-36.
109. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supra note 3, at 293-94.
110. Id. at 293 (asserting that segregation is morally wrong and sinful because it
relegates those subject to it as not persons but things).
111. Id. at 289-302.
112. Id. at 289.
113. Id. at 293-95.
114. See King, Love, Law and Civil Disobedience, supra note 78, at 43-53 for a
transcription of the address.
115. See id, at 44-47 (defending the civil disobedience engaged in by students
and discussing its philosophical underpinnings).
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as a fundamental distinction between the two."' He explained:
[The students recognize that there are two types of laws.
There are just laws and there are unjust laws. And they
would be the first to say obey the just laws, they would be the
first to say that men and women have a moral obligation to
obey just and right laws. And they would go on to say that we
must see that there are unjust laws . . . . [Wlhat is the

difference between a just and unjust law? Well, a just law is a
law that squares with a moral law. It is a law that squares
with that which is right, so any law that uplifts human
personality is a just law. Whereas that law which is out of
harmony with the moral is a law which does not square with
the moral law of the universe." 7
In King's view, the moral law is preeminent and accords with a
divine law established by God."" Likewise, King saw God
establishing certain rights for individuals in their relationships
with others."9 These he called "God given rights,""0 in agreement
with the statement in the Declaration of Independence that "all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.""' King connected natural
law with these and other pronouncements by the Founding
Fathers and President Abraham Lincoln."' King saw a direct
connection between the rights and freedoms that people enjoy and
the dictates of natural law.123
In King's pronouncements, the natural law establishes rigid
categories that demand clear responses.124 An unjust law like
segregation demands rejection and noncooperation as part of an
unjust system.125 King stated that just laws should be obeyed and
unjust laws should not."' This, King pointed out, flows from a
duty not to cooperate with an evil system.127

116. Id. at 48-49.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supra note 3, at 293
(discussing the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor).
120. Id. at 292.
121. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 33, at para. 2.

122. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supranote 3, at 297.
123. See King,Love, Law and Civil Disobedience,supra note 78, at 48-49 ("[L]aw
which is out of harmony with the moral is a law which does not square with the
moral law of the universe.").
124. See id. at 48.
125. See, e.g., id. at 49 ("For many individuals who would call themselves
segregationists . . . they seek to evade the law, and their process can lead to
anarchy.").
126. Id. This contrasts with the more nuanced approach developed by Aquinas.
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To explain how to decide the justness of a law, King appealed
to the natural law as a standard, expounding that a law that
conforms to morality is "right."'28 To assess a law's morality, King
initially looked to its effect on human personality.'" Laws that
uphold personhood are moral and therefore just and right, while
those that "degrade ] the human personality" are immoral and
unjust.3 0 While King expanded the category of unjust laws later
in the address based on the process of their development, he did
not explain how laws uphold or degrade personhood.'
To clarify his meaning in more secular and practical terms,
King said, "an unjust law is a code which the majority inflicts upon
the minority, which that minority had no part in enacting or
creating, because that minority had no right to vote . . . ." This
undemocratic process of legislating against minority interests,
King maintained, renders the resulting law unjust.'3 This relates
back to the discussion of a law's legitimacy based on its promulgation in accordance with preexisting legal procedures and
requirements.' 34 Although King did not maintain that states that
denied Blacks the right to vote were breaking state or federal
laws, he was arguing that they violated the principles of
democracy underlying the American legal system.3 5
These violations of what King understood as the spirit of the
law evidenced in the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and the Emancipation Proclamation represented
miscarriages of justice discernible in terms that King believed
natural law skeptics and atheists alike could equally appreciate. 3
"An unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a minority that
is not binding on itself. This is difference made legal. On the
other hand, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority
to follow that it is willing to follow itself," King explained. 3 ' His
point was simple: segregation laws contradicted basic notions of

See AQUINAs: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 143-44.
127. See King, Love, Law and Civil Disobedience,supra note 78, at 47.
128. Id. at 48.
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 43-53.
132. Id. at 49.
133. Id.
134. See supraPart I.B.
135. King, Love, Law and Civil Disobedience,supra note 78, at 49.
136. King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supra note 3, at 292-302.
137. Id. at 294.
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fairness.'" They were passed in states that denied Black residents
the right to vote for the legislators who drafted the laws or the
governors who signed them."9 Furthermore, they were applied
hypocritically to place limitations on the Black minority that the
White majority would have been unwilling to follow if universally
applied. 14

C. American DemocraticIdeology, Law, and Justice
A critical component of King's view of law and justice grew
from the United States' democratic ideology."' King described law
and justice as the fulfillment and embodiment of basic principles
articulated by the Founders of the nation in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, and later extended by Lincoln
in the Emancipation Proclamation:14 2
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent
words of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which
every American was to fall heir. This note was the promise
that all men, yes, [BIlack men as well as [W]hite men, would
be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this
promissory note in so far as her citizens of color are concerned.
Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given
the Negro people a bad check; a check which has come back
marked "insufficient funds." We refuse to believe that there
are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this
nation. And so we have come to cash this check, a check that
will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the
security of justice.'4
This passage, from King's keynote address for the March on
Washington, highlights his consistent description of a chief goal of
the Civil Rights Movement as the fulfillment of the American
138. See id. at 293-95.
139. King, Love, Law and Civil Disobedience,supra note 78, at 49.
140. Id.
141. See Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope, PLAYBOY, Jan. 16, 1969,
reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 313, 314-15 (arguing that
Americans should acknowledge the principles of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" as applying to all individuals).
142. See King, The Ethical Demands of Integration, supra note 64, at 119. These
principles also demonstrated King's commitment to the sacredness of human
personality. In an address to a church conference in 1963, King explained, "[tihis
idea of the dignity and worth of human personality is expressed eloquently and
unequivocally in the Declaration of Independence .

. .

. Never has a sociopolitical

document proclaimed more profoundly and eloquently the sacredness of human
personality." Id.
143. King, I Have a Dream, supra note 19, at 217.
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creed provided in the Declaration of Independence that "all men
are created equal."' King understood that, despite the promise of
the creed, the reality for Blacks was legal and social inequality.
Beginning the same speech with a reference to the "beacon light of
hope" that the Emancipation Proclamation brought to "millions of
Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering
injustice," King articulated the inconsistency in the promises of
equality and freedom and the lived experiences of Black people.'
"But one hundred years [after the Emancipation Proclamation] the
Negro still is not free; one hundred years later, the life of the
Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the
chains of discrimination."
This contradiction or tension fueled King's understanding of
and approach to the issue of law and justice." Approaching the
matter as an activist and unwilling victim, rather than as a
detached scholar weighing abstract ideas of political and legal
philosophy, King saw racial discrimination and segregation as
evils that directly contravened the great principles of the nation."*
Quoting a lecture by Frederick Douglass on the Constitution, he
noted that its language speaks unreservedly of "[wie the people,"
without qualification as to race or class or other status. 49 King,
like Douglass, saw a claim in the Constitution towards an
undifferentiated humanity that necessarily included Blacks as
members of humanity who should be included in "the benefits for
which the Constitution of America was ordained and
established.""o The rightful extension of the benefits of the
Constitution and the rights described in the Declaration of
Independence represented the embodiment of law and justice to
King: the end to a long night of injustice."' The Supreme Court
had instilled hope in King and others in 1954 with the landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education."' Speaking of Brown,
King remarked, "It came as a reaffirmation of the good old
144. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 33, at para. 2.

145. King, I Have a Dream,supra note 19, at 217.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 217-18.

148. King, The Ethical Demands for Integration,supra note 64, at 119 (referring
to the dignity and worth expressed by the principles of the Declaration of
Independence).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Martin Luther King, Jr., Give Us the Ballot-We Will Transform the South
(May 17, 1957), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 197, 197
(referring to the recent decision to end segregation in public schools).

152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In
American doctrine of freedom and equality for all people.""
this decision that undermined the scourge of legally sanctioned
segregation entrenched in Plessy v. Ferguson,"' King saw a
foreshadowing of the day when law and justice promised by the
Founding Fathers would become a reality for their Black
progeny.1 55
In the Letter from Birmingham City Jail, King connected his
defense of civil disobedience in Birmingham with the prevalence of
unjust laws that compel disobedience.156 To help his readers know
just from unjust laws, King expanded on his discussion of
Personalism and natural law with concrete examples rooted in the
principles of the nation's democracy:
An unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minority which that
minority had no part in enacting or creating because they did
not have the unhampered right to vote. Who can say that the
legislature of Alabama which set up the segregation laws was
democratically elected? Throughout the state of Alabama all
types of conniving methods are used to prevent Negroes from
becoming registered voters . . . despite the fact that the Negro

constitutes a majority of the population. Can any law set up
in such a state be considered democratically structured? 5 7
Alabama, the South, and the entire nation's failure to ensure
the right to vote for millions of Blacks served as one of the
principle injustices for which King sought a legal remedy."' He
described this particular Jim Crow practice as "a tragic betrayal of
the highest mandates of our democratic tradition" and as
"democracy turned upside down."" 9
Law and justice for King was the end of Jim Crow
On three separate but consistent grounds, King
segregation."
saw the end of the nation's legal contradiction-promising freedom
and equality for all but providing bondage and racial inequality for
Blacks-as a fundamental requirement of law and justice.' 6' To

153. King, Give Us the Ballot-We Will Transform the South, supra note 151, at
197.
154. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana law requiring racial segregation
on trains).

155. See King, Give Us the Ballot-We Will Transform the South, supra note 151,
at 197.

156. See King,Letter from Birmingham City Jail,supra note 3, at 289.
157. Id. at 294.
158. King, Give Us the Ballot-We Will Transform the South, supra note 151, at
197 (arguing that the prevention of voter registration was a betrayal of democratic
principles).
159. Id.

160. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail,supra note 3, at 293.
161. See King, I Have a Dream, supra note 19, at 217-18.
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King, segregation laws were an affront to human personality and
dignity, an immoral contravention of the natural law, and
inconsistent with the democratic principles of the United States.162
Only once they ended could law and justice begin.
In the remainder of this Article, I consider how King's views
compare to two contemporary legal discourses: critical legal
studies and critical race theory. I will buttress the optimism of
King that grounded his views above with later statements from
him following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, his visit
to Watts, and his lackluster campaign in Chicago. These later
statements focus more on the substantial reform required to meet
the needs of Black Northerners and Southerners trapped in
ghettos and rural poverty.'" It was during this period that King
came to more fully appreciate that legal rights alone could not
secure the material wellbeing of Blacks that racial justice
demanded."*
III. Dr. King and Contemporary Legal Discourse
A. CriticalLegal Studies, Law, and Justice
Contemporary scholars reject many of the foundational
beliefs undergirding King's philosophy.'" The most divergent view
in today's scholarship comes from the adherents of Critical Legal
Studies (CLS).1" The CLS movement grew out of scholarly
critiques of legal and political thought in the late 1970s that
challenged philosophical claims that the existing legal system
represented an objective, determinate, and politically neutral
system.16 Many scholars espousing this view contend that the
American legal system advances a liberal capitalist ideology using
a hierarchical vision of the world built on patterns of domination
and subordination that appear fixed, immutable, and proper.'" A
second theme of the CLS scholarship is the indeterminate nature
162. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supra note 3, at 293 ("So

segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, but it is
morally wrong and sinful.").
163. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Showdown for Nonviolence, LOOK, Apr. 16,

1968, reprintedin ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 64, 64-72.
164. See id. at 67 ("We need an economic bill of rights. This would guarantee a
job to all people who want to work and are able to work.").
165. See LEVIT ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-53 (noting that civil disobedience may
not be simply just or unjust behavior as it is still an illegal act committed for what
the actor deems a moral reason).
166. See id. at 402.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 402-03.
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of legal rules and reasoning.'" Scholars advancing this view
critique claims that legal rules necessitate particular judgments in
legal cases; instead, they maintain that law fails to provide judges
with objective criteria necessitating particular rulings. '
CLS
scholars argue that the prevalence of competing claims and
considerations in cases dictates that judges bring subjective value
judgments into play when reaching their conclusions."' The chief
development of this CLS theme is a critique of rights discourse as
both a fagade that hides the actual needs and relationships
paramount to desired outcomes, and an ephemeral signifier devoid
of the content necessary to ensure or determine legal results. 7
This question of the importance or relevance of rights will serve as
the central theme of my analysis of King's views relative to these
more recent jurisprudential movements. Namely, how does King's
conception of law and justice-the realization of the natural rights
provided by God that uphold human personality in accordance
with natural law, as promised by the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution-withstand the challenge made by CLS
scholars?
In an article entitled An Essay on Rights, Mark Tushnet
provides a seminal CLS critique of rights discourse in which he
describes the four elements of his critical assessment.7 They are
instability, indeterminacy, abstraction, and impediment. " Rights
are unstable: as social circumstances change so does the meaning
and availability of rights. 1 Rights produce indeterminate results:
the existence or nonexistence of one or more rights fails to
"produce determinate consequences.""' The rights concept is an
abstraction from reality: the notion of rights substitutes an empty
abstraction for actual experiences that should be valued. ' Rights
impede social change: rights discussions function as formidable
obstacles to the changes needed to restructure society in
accordance with a progressive agenda.'7 1

169. Id. at 402.
170. LEVIT ET AL., supra note 2, at 402 ("On the legal reasoning level, the
abstract rhetoric of rights and rules masks subjective value adjudication.").
171. See id. ("[Diecisionmaking inevitably includes subjective value judgments.").
172. See id. at 404 ("Rights are unstable and ultimately unreliable. . .
173. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1363.
176. Id. at 1364.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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After a brief elaboration of the first two elements of Tushnet's
assessment, I evaluate the strength of their merits relative to
King's view of law and justice. I begin with his initial claim that
rights suffer from instability. 17' As abstract principles, rights have
no coherent meaning outside the context of particular situations
and societal understandings.8 0 Tushnet explains, "[t]he conditions
of the society define exactly what kind of rights-talk makes sense,
and the sort of rights-talk that makes sense in turn defines what
the society is."' In other words, rights depend on the historical
contingency of particular societies and only have meaning in light
of those contingencies.182 In turn, the contingencies themselves
determine the nature of the society and the social meanings that
govern relationships."" As conditions change within societies and
social meanings shift, so will the meaning of rights, thereby
Because of this instability, the
revealing their instability.
successful recognition of rights on one day may completely lose its
value the next day, or at some point in the future under changed
circumstances.

18

Applying this assessment to King's view of law and justice
reveals the historic contingency of King's argument. King and his
predecessor Frederick Douglass argued that Blacks in the United
States fell within the protections of the Constitution because they
were "people," but this only makes sense if there is a putative
understanding within society that Blacks are in fact "people."'
179. See id. at 1370.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1370-71.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Here we might consider how the meaning of many constitutional rights
changed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. New legal interpretations employed by the
federal government in light of the perceived risk of additional attacks affected a
host of constitutional rights including a right to counsel, a right to a speedy trail,
and a right to confront accusers, among others. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI
("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . .. and to have the

assistance of [c]ounsel for his defense."). For examples of post-September 11
federal interpretations affecting constitutional rights, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Guantinamo detainees are entitled to a prompt
habeas corpus hearing); Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantdnamo: Rights at the
Brink of Dehumanization, 103 Nw. U.L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2009) (noting the
significance of the Supreme Court's upholding constitutional rights of noncitizen
wartime prisoners after "six years of government insistence that the prisoners at
Guantdnamo had no rights whatsoever, and could be held indefinitely, even for life,
without charge or meaningful opportunity to contest their treatment or detention").
186. King, The Ethical Demands for Integration, supra note 64, at 119. For a
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The fact that some Whites and most Blacks held this view when
the Constitution was signed could not establish the societal
meaning of the term or legal rights derived therein.187 Instead,
this understanding developed across the history of the nation out
of many contingent occurrences." Likewise, the Declaration of
Independence's claim that "all Men" were endowed by their
Creator with unalienable rights should be considered in light of
the predominant view of the time that Black males could not
become "men."189 Of course, this is the argument that Justice
Taney made in Dred Scott that infuriated some and placated
others.'" Its relevance to my argument is that the Civil War
seems to have been fought in part to determine which social
meaning of "people" and "man" would prevail. The outcome of the
war and the ensuing occupation of the South partially settled the
question for Blacks in the North and temporarily settled the
question for Blacks in the South." While Northern troops were
present, the right to vote guaranteed to Black men by the
Fifteenth Amendment meant that they could freely participate in
elections and even hold office.192 Following the withdrawal of the
troops from the South, however, the right to vote for Southern
Black men had a completely different set of meanings that led to
seven decades of disenfranchisement. 1
In addition to a challenge to the stability of rights across
time, Tushnet also proffers a challenge to what he calls the
technical indeterminacy of rights.'"
Technical indeterminacy
addresses the fact that in individual cases, judges use a balancing
process to determine a right's existence, extent, limitation,
significance, and benefit.'" Because of this myriad of considerations, the existence of a right does not compel any particular

contrary view, consider Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
393, 399-454 (1861).
187. See Tushnet, supra note 173, at 1370-71.
188. For a consideration on the relevance of the Declaration of Independence to
Blacks, see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 36, at 371-89.
189. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 33, at para. 2,

with Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410.
190. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410.
191. For a discussion of Blacks' struggle to obtain personhood before and
following the Civil War, see VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 258-317 (1992).
192. See id. at 287-97.
193. Id. at 306-17.

194. Tushnet, supra note 173, at 1371-72.
195. Id.
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outcome in a given case.19 As judges balance rights against each
other, weigh the affected interests, and construct the background
situation, a host of subjective valuations obscure any necessary
outcomes.'97 Tushnet explains that the risk of focusing on rightsbased arguments is basic: "[blecause rights-talk is indeterminate,
it can provide only momentary advantages in ongoing political
struggles.""'
As we consider the four decades since the passage of the civil
rights statutes of the 1960s, we can better appreciate the concern
about indeterminacy and its consequences. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based
on race.'" However, as early as 1970 the Supreme Court decided a
seminal employment discrimination case that tested the meaning
of discrimination under Title VII. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,20
the Court considered whether an employer could require that
employees pass an aptitude test as a condition to employment or
promotion, when there was evidence that the test disproportionately excluded Black workers from access to desirable inside
jobs.' 0 ' The court of appeals held that the employer's subjective
intent was determinative, and held against the Black employees
The
because of the absence of purposeful discrimination.'"
Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that the use of tests,
unrelated to job qualifications, that disparately impacted Blacks
violated the protection afforded to Blacks under the statute."
Within six years of the Court's decision in Griggs, the
Supreme Court heard a similar case, Washington v. Davis, "
regarding examinations at the Washington, D.C. police academy.205
In that case, the Supreme Court overturned the appellate court's
decision ruling that the use of a written verbal skills exam was
unconstitutional because of the disparate racial impact it created
by excluding otherwise qualified Blacks from joining the police
force.'" The Supreme Court held that the protection provided by
Title VII did not apply to the Washington, D.C. police department
196. See id. at 1372-73.

197. Id.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 1371.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 436.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 237.
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because no such right against disparate impacts exists under the
Equal Protection Clause.207 Unlike under a Title VII analysis, the
Court held that under an equal protection analysis the test was a
valid and acceptable practice that could be used to improve the
qualifications of the employees even if it could not be shown to
improve job performance.20 8
These two watershed cases in civil rights law highlight the
indeterminacy of legal rules and rights. Leading up to these
decisions, courts had used the same analysis of racial discrimination claims under both Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause.2" Griggs held that the test was unacceptable, despite the
holding of the court of appeals,"' while Davis found the test
unlawful, even though the court of appeals had found it
acceptable.2 1 ' Here we have two similar periods, two similar tests,
two similar issues, but two different results. In these two casesand the numerous others like them from 1971 to 1976, and from
1976 to today-a discussion of the "right" to be free from racial
discrimination adds little to an evaluation of a Black person's
ability to gain employment or access to jobs or other benefits when
he or she does not perform as well as Whites on written
examinations.2 " Although the right to be free from racially based
employment discrimination in most jobs was established in
1964,213 the ability to be free from such racial discrimination is a
completely different matter. 2 4 To argue for the creation of a right
to be free from racial discrimination in employment in American
society has no meaning today-not because people are all free from
racial discrimination, but because the right to be free exists. 211

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 239.
Id. at 249-52.
Id. at 237.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 237.
For a discussion of the limitations of legal rights against discrimination in
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Persons concerned with enjoying this actual freedom, therefore,
might look to other means or methods to achieve it that do not
infringe on their rights.21 6
King's focus on law and justice may have belied an inordinate
emphasis on, and confidence in, rights' ability to establish legal
from future
insulate Blacks
that would
protections
discrimination. 17 Despite the indeterminacy and instability of
Blacks' newly acquired rights, the importance of the attainment of
formal equality for Blacks should not be undervalued.21 8 The
destruction of White supremacy in the South as an accepted social
norm substantially changed the lived experiences of Black
Southerners,219 who did then and still do represent the vast
majority of the United States' Black population.220 In the South,
the call for rights and the extension of formal equality to Blacks
was closely intertwined with the demand for equal recognition and
equal regard in the public sphere.22 King expressed this in his
concerns about the immorality of segregation as a double standard
that the White majority imposed upon the Black minority and an
assault upon the dignity of Blacks that correspondingly diminished the personhood of Whites.222 As such, the CLS critique fails
to account for the importance of defeating the public presumption
of White supremacy and superiority in the psyche of Black and
White Southerners.222
However, the focus on rights and formal equality did limit
King
the reach of the victory to the American South.'
acknowledged that himself in 1965 following the riots in Watts,
216. See RoY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (1996); Carlton Waterhouse, Follow the Yellow Brick Road: Perusing the
Path to Constitutionally Permissible Reparations for Slavery and Jim Crow Era
Governmental Discrimination,62 RUTGERS L. REV. 163 (2009).
217. See King,A Testament of Hope, supra note 141, at 314-22.
218. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331, 1378-79 (1988).
219. See id. at 1378 ("Removal of these public manifestations of subordination
was a significant gain for all Blacks . . . .").
220. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION:
2010, at 7 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20O/briefs/c2Ol0br06.pdf.
221. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Civil Right No. 1: The Right To Vote, N.Y.
TIRIES, Mar. 14, 1965, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 182,
182-88.
222. King, Letterfrom Birmingham City Jail, supra note 3, at 291-94.
223. For an in-depth discussion for the limitation of CLS on issues of race, see
Crenshaw, supra note 218, at 1349-56.
224. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Next Stop: The North, SATURDAY REV., Nov.
13, 1965, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supranote 1, at 189, 189.
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Los Angeles. 225 He asserted, "It is in the South that Negroes in
this past decade experienced the birth of human dignity .... In
the North, on the other hand, the Negro's repellent slum life was
altered not for the better but for the worse." 226 After spending time
in Los Angeles and Chicago, King came to appreciate that his
focus on rights did not account for the miserable conditions of
many Blacks in the North and in the West who already enjoyed
the formal rights for which the movement fought.227 In the same
address, King identified the failure of civil rights leaders to
adequately account for their strategy's Northern consequence as a
"4miscalculation."2 ' This miscalculation is what the CLS perspective helps elucidate.22 9
B. CriticalRace Theory, Law, and Justice
Critical race theorists bring a critical perspective to current
and past antidiscrimination law. Though influenced by CLS,
Critical Race Theory (CRT) looks primarily to the limitations of
antidiscrimination law and its ability to address the continuing
problem of societal racism.2 Therefore, unlike CLS, CRT does not
reject law as a viable means to produce societal reform, but
instead serves as more of a lamentation regarding the courts'
failure to provide racial justice in post-civil rights era cases despite
CRT scholarship
the symbolic provision of formal equality."
insulation and
courts'
the
federal
of
analysis
a
discerning
provides
and
reinforce
that
produce
practices
of
social
protection
22
challenge.
substantive racial and gender inequality from legal
As a correlative insight, CRT scholars have shown how the
federal courts' ongoing rejection of remedial efforts to rectify
discriminatory conduct against racial and ethnic minorities
protects societal privileges and advantages afforded Whites as a
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 189-90.
228. Id. at 190.
229. Although King lacked the benefit of the CLS perspective at the time,
Malcolm X consistently pointed out the limitations of the approach. See JAMES
CONE, MARTIN AND MALCOLM IN AMERICA (Orbis 1992) for an examination of the

contrasting views and perspectives of Malcolm X and King on race in the United
States.
230. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 5, 13-32

(Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the relationship between CRT
and CLS).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Additionally, CRT
result of historic racial discrimination.'m
emphasizes critical feminist discourses examining the intersection
of race and gender and the prevalence of societal racism against
Blacks, Latinos, and other racial minorities despite the promise of
formal legal equality.234 In this section, I focus my analysis on
CRT's concern with the rejection of race-based remedies by postcivil rights era courts, and its relevance to King's vision of law and
justice. Although many CRT scholars would recognize the value
and importance of the rights-centered formal equality rhetoric of
King and the Civil Rights Movement at the time it was used, they
would likely mirror King's disappointment with the progress made
beyond the extension of rights.2 35
Kimberl6 Crenshaw authored one of the seminal works in
CRT, engaging both the CLS critique of rights and the
neoconservative critique of race-based remedies. 6 In the article,
she raises a very important issue that has great relevance for our
consideration of King's view of law and justice."' Drawing on a
common theme in CRT that racial justice requires race-based
remedies, 3 1 Crenshaw asserts that formal equality gained through
civil rights law undermines arguments that racism bears any
meaningful relationship to the material wellbeing of Blacks." In
effect, by focusing demands on the elimination of the disjuncture
in the nation's promised and afforded rights for its citizens, the
movement's success in gaining the passage of civil rights laws
requiring formal equality severed the relationship between
historic racism and conditions of material inequality in the minds
of most Whites." She explains the distinction between symbolic
and material subordination as follows:
233. Id.
234. Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
supranote 230, at 357, 357-77.
235. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, supranote 3, at 295-300.
236. Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, supra note 230, at 103.

237. Commenting on the strategy used by civil rights leaders, Crenshaw notes:
Movement leaders used these tactics to force open a conflict between
[Wlhites, which eventually benefited [Bilack people. Casting racial issues
in the moral and legal rights rhetoric of the prevailing ideology helped to
create the political controversy without which the state's coercive function
would not have been enlisted to aid [Bilacks.
Id. at 117.
238. Id. at 103-19.
239. Id. at 114-16.
240. Id. at 115.
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Symbolic subordination refers to the formal denial of social
and political equality to all [BIlacks, regardless of their
accomplishments . . . . Material subordination, on the other
hand, refers to the ways that discrimination and exclusion
economically subordinated [B)Iacks to [Wihites and
subordinated the life chances of [BIlacks to those of [Wihites
on almost every level.2 4 1
These two, Crenshaw recognizes, were typically connected in the
minds of most people.24 ' However, the end of legal segregation
resulted in society's acceptance of formal equality and the
inclusion of Blacks as equal members in the nation's political
vision.2 4 3 Crenshaw points out that, consequently, Blacks' experiences of material subordination are viewed as the result of
cultural inferiority rather than historic or continued discrimination.'" She goes on to elaborate that the same legal reforms
that removed symbolic subordination now support an ideological
framework that makes contemporary experiences of Blacks facing
material subordination seem "fair and reasonable. 4 5
King became painfully aware of this paradox in the last years
of his life. He asked:
Why is the issue of equality still so far from solution in
America, a nation that professes itself to be democratic,
inventive, hospitable to new ideas, rich, productive and
awesomely powerful? . . . America is deeply racist and its

democracy is flawed both economically and socially . . . .
Justice for [B]lack people will not flow into society merely from
court decisions nor from fountains of political oratory. Nor
will a few token changes quell all the tempestuous yearnings
of millions of disadvantaged [Bilack people .. .. When millions

of people have been cheated for centuries, restitution is a
costly process.24
He continued:
Many [W]hites hasten to congratulate themselves on what
little progress we Negroes have made. I'm sure that most
[W]hites felt that with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, all race problems were automatically solved. Because
most [W]hite people are so far removed from the life of the
average Negro, there has been little to challenge this
assumption. Yet Negroes continue to live with racism every
day. It doesn't matter where we are individually in the
scheme of things, how near we may be either to the top or to

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 114-16.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116-18.
King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail,supra note 3, at 314.
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the bottom of society; the cold facts of racism slap each one of
us in the face.
In these passages, King addressed a significant problem that
followed the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 that
also concerns CRT scholars-formal equality provided by the
legislation could not achieve law and justice for Blacks. 24 King's
remarks suggest recognition that the end of lawful segregation
and the formal extension of legal rights to Blacks that had been
afforded to Whites failed to meet the full demands of law and
justice by ending widespread racial discrimination against Blacks
or by satisfying legal notions of restitution for past wrongs.249
These realizations underscore the ways that King's vision of law
and justice based in procedural justice was incomplete-lacking an
adequate vision of restorative justice.
Overall, King's view of law and justice was well suited to the
time and the needs of the majority of Blacks who, like him, lived
under the powerful grip of Jim Crow segregation.250 Crenshaw
persuasively argues in her article that, in fact, the federal
government only supported King and the Civil Rights Movement
because of the way the argument was framed.m' She explains,
"Because [Bilacks were challenging their exclusion from political
society, the only claims that were likely to achieve recognition
were those which reflected American society's institutional logicCrenshaw acknowledges that although
legal rights ideology."
the rights-based arguments did place limitations on the possible
accomplishments of the movement, its leadership-like most
oppressed people-found themselves "between a rock and a hard
place," as broader claims beyond the rights ideology would have
fallen on deaf ears.2 5
C.

Restorative Justice and Reparations

While Crenshaw's defense of the movement's approach
carries great merit, I believe that King's failure to include

247. Id. at 321-22.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 314, 322.
250. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., The Current Crisis in Race Relations,
NEW S., Mar. 1958, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 85, 85-90
(describing the heavy pushback from Southern states following the Brown
decision).
251. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, supra note 236, at 111-12.
252. Id. at 111.
253. Id. at 112.
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restorative justice as an essential element of law and justice in the
early days of the movement was avoidable. By 1963, King had
recognized the issue.2 5 In his book, Why We Can't Wait, he wrote:
The ancient common law has always provided a remedy for the
appropriation of the labor of one human being by another.
This law should be made to apply for American Negroes. The
payment should be in the form of a massive program by the
government of special, compensatory measures which could be
in accordance with the accepted
regarded as a settlement
255
practice of common law.
Even here, it is not clear the extent to which King is fully invested
in the claim. 5 6 Although he raises the issue, he also makes the
broader problem of poverty for poor Whites a component, and fails
to sufficiently develop the redress claim as an independent and
essential element of law and justice. 2 " Ultimately, the claim for
redress becomes overshadowed in King's subsequent writings and
speeches by his focus on the federal government's obligation to end
poverty.2 " Before that time, King consistently and tirelessly
focused his arguments around ending segregation. 25 9 Although
King was convinced of the need to address poverty before that
time, the chief concern of the Civil Rights Movement, as voiced by
King, was the end of segregation as a dictate of law and justice.2 6
2

254. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 137-52 (1964)
[hereinafter KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT].

255. Id. at 137.
256. See id. King's decision not to press this point may have been strategic
based on a belief that Whites would not support it and that Blacks did not demand
it.
257. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, I MAY NOT GET THERE WITH You 317 (2000) for

a contrary view. Dyson argues that King's inclusion of poor Whites as beneficiaries
reflected his dual commitment to remedying slavery and past discrimination
against Blacks, as well bringing about economic justice for Whites. Id.
258. King's later speeches and writings consistently address the issue of poverty
as a central concern with only occasional references to slavery as a justification.
See, e.g., King, I Have a Dream, supra note 19, at 217; King, Nobel Prize

Acceptance Speech, supra note 19, at 224 ("I am mindful that debilitating and
grinding poverty afflicts my people and chains them to the lowest rung of the
economic ladder."). This did not become a focal point, however, until the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was passed. See, e.g., King, A Testament of Hope, supra note
141, at 313-28 ("Confronted now with the interrelated problems of war, inflation,
urban decay, [Wihite backlash and a climate of violence [the nation] is now forced
to address itself to race relations and poverty, and it is tragically unprepared.").
259. See Martin Luther King, Jr., The Burning Truth in the South,
PROGRESSIVE, May 1960, reprinted in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 94,
94-98; King, The Ethical Demands for Integration, supra note 64, at 117-25;
Bernice McNair Barnett, Invisible Southern Black Women Leaders in the Civil
Rights Movement: The Triple Constraintsof Gender, Race, and Class, 7 GENDER &
Soc'Y, 162, 162-82 (1993).
260. King, The Burning Truth in the South, supra note 259, at 94-98.
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We can only speculate on what might have resulted if King
had strongly linked the demand for Black rights with restitution
for their past abridgment as a central theme of the Civil Rights
Movement. Such an approach, arguably, would have allowed for a
more sweeping movement that more effectively captured the needs
of Blacks across the country, while still keeping the end of
segregation in the forefront. This would have provided a more
fundamental alliance between Black Northerners and Black
Southerners that could have nurtured a Northern component of
the movement advocating both civil rights and restitution. It
might also have avoided the bifurcation of civil rights and
remedial measures for past discrimination that the Court now
deems unconstitutional as violations of the civil rights of Whites.261
Conclusion
Clearly, King's exceptional vision was less than 20/20. After
all, in the same way that Personalism, the nation's founding
documents, and natural law brought him to see segregation as a
violation of law and justice, King should have seen the same
dictate for Black women and all women. 26 2 Today, scholars and
others have come to see that law and justice dictate equality before
the law regardless of race, gender, national origin, religion,
disability, sexual identity, or class. 2 6 This expansion of King's
vision also includes restorative justice and redress for years of
segregation and exclusion suffered before and during the Civil
Rights Movement.2" Although the courts and Congress have yet
to recognize and establish legal equality and rights in all of these
areas, the validity and importance of these rights are even more
apparent in the United States and around the world today than
during King's life.2' Nonetheless, as many critical theorists might

261. Of course, there are other issues that also could, and arguably should, have
been included in King's view of law and justice, including the equal treatment of
Black women both inside and outside of the movement. See CONE, supra note 229,
at 272-87 for a detailed consideration of King's views on gender.
262. Unfortunately, space does not allow me to examine this issue. See id.
263. See Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-88 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on sex); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on
race, religion, sex, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability); Michael
Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class

Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006) (describing prohibitions of discrimination based
on class).
264. See KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, supra note 254, at 134-36.
265. See, e.g., laws cited supra note 263.
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note, legal rights and remedies will often fall short of the
substantive goals they represent, even when fully recognized.
Accordingly, if living today, perhaps King would see the challenge
more expansively to require rights and remedies that both
preserve and protect human personality for all as a fundamental
tenet of American democracy worth fighting for. Yet we should
not saddle King's vision with the battles that history dictates we
wage; instead, we would do well to marry our own visions of law
and justice with a commitment to activism that society finds as
compelling as King's.

